Death from exposure is the coroner's usual verdict when a hill walker or climber is found dead by a search party and there are no injuries to account for death. Cases occur every year in the hilly regions of Britain but are seldom reported except in the popular press. It seems safe to assume that hypothermia is the cause of death in these cases, though there is no proof of this. Accidental hypothermia also occurs among potholers (Lloyd, 1964) , yachtsmen, and dinghy sailors as a result of immersion in cold water, but this paper deals with the special problems of the first group. The causes and symptomatology of this type of hypothermia are described and methods of prevention suggested. (Pugh, 1964 14 .30 hours wet and cold. It returned by the miners' track. On the way down A. B., aged 18, began to tire and slowed the others. The party reached the causeway at 17.10 hours and found it flooded. By this time everyone was tired and A. B. was exhausted. It was getting dark and they had no torches. They began to traverse the slopes around the lower part of Llydaw; A. B. had to be assisted.
Sources of Information
They missed their way and one of the boys fell some 15 feet (460 cm.) down a crag but was not injured. Despite this warning, A. B., who was dazed, also fell down the same crag and rolled a further 20 feet (600 cm.), sustaining facial injuries. After this he was only semi-conscious. All four of them then huddled together in the shelter of some boulders. A. B. died one or two hours later. The others survived. Necropsy showed no cerebral injury but fairly severe facial injuries with a fracture of the mandible. The cause of death was given as exposure and shock. death, and the survival of a woman when four men died.
Incident 13
Five fit and experienced climbers from Lancashire, aged 18 to 20, camped on Ben Nevis on 24/25 December 1956, intending to climb the mountain by South Castle Gully. They spent the nexs day climbing, but were delayed, and it was dark by the time they reached the summit. A blizzard was now blowing, and two of the party were exhausted. They spent the night in a shallow depression but could not escape the wind. However, they survived and next morning one of them went down to fetch help. On arrival he was unable to describe accurately the position of his companions, and his memory of recent events was vague. Another member of the party attempted to descend that morning and was found dead at the bottom of a cliff. Two rescue parties set out that day and failed to find the casualties. Their three bodies were eventually found on the following day. They were wearing anoraks, knee-breeches, and stockings, and their clothes were wet through.
Incident 14
On 20 December 1961 four men, aged 23 to 26, set out from the top of the Cairngorm ski lift (3,000 feet; 910 m.), leaving no word of their plans. They went over Cairngorm (4,000 feet; 1,219 m.) and down to the shelter stones near Loch Avon, intending to spend the night there. They had no sleeping bags but were warmly clad and had a primus stove and plenty of fuel. However, they got wet through and at 18.00 hours decided to return to the car park. In spite of map and compass they got lost and wandered all night at around 4,000 feet (1,219 m.). One man, A. B., was " in a bad way " and an attempt was made to lower him down one of the corries on a rope. The rope slipped off a belay and he and another (C. D.) rolled down 200 feet (61 m.), but without injury. The other two went for help and came upon a three-man party of skiers in tents. With their help the alarm was given and rescue operations started. At 02.00 hours next morning A. B. was found lying in the snow but conscious. C. D. was still on his feet. A. B. was admitted to hospital suffering from exposure, shock, and frostbite. But for the chance meeting with the skiers both would have lost their lives.
Incident 15
This accident happened during an ascent of Cairngorm on 30 October 1962. An Outward Bound party led by instructors left Fairndouran Lodge at 07.50 hours, reached the saddle of Cairngorm at 10.15 hours, and the summit around 11.15 hours. By this time A. B., aged 18, was lagging behind. He said he had hurt his ankle. The party rested on the summit for some time. On the way down A. B.'s companion took his pack and helped him. They reached the upper ski-lift station (3,000 feet ; 914 m.) at 13.00 hours, only to find it shut. By then A. B. was fuddled and vague. Shortly afterwards he collapsed and was taken down on a stretcher to the lower station. While on the stretcher they carried him feet down ; he had a convulsion and a block-of wood was placed between his teeth. Breathing ceased two minutes later.
The findings at the necropsy were as follows: moderate oedema of the extreme upper part of the larynx but no obstruction of the respiratory passages ; some congestion of the trachea and main bronchi, and a notable degree of collapse of both lower lobes, the right middle lobe and the posterior parts of the upper lobes ; no evidence of pneumonia but some muco-purulent exudate in the trachea and bronchi. Histological examination was confirmatory and showed no evidence of myocarditis. Cause of death was laryngeal spasm, vagal inhibition of the heart. This boy was thin. His height was 5 feet 8 inches (170 cm.) and his weight was 130 lb (5 8.9 kg.). According to the warden's report weather conditions on the hill were cold and windy with plenty of blown snow. top of a mountain 3,900 feet (1,188 m.) high. The weather was warm and sunny. The leader, aged 21, had five years' experience in the hills. The boys wore Army windproof outer garments and two pullovers ; each boy carried a spare pullover. They also had food with them.
One of the three groups, six in number, had just reached the top at 14.00 hours when bad weather suddenly blew up-hail, rain, wind, and freezing mist. The party forsook the direct route down and took an easier route to the valley. Two hours later the youngest boy, aged 16, was feeling unwell; he was assisted by the leader, who sent the others ahead and himself carried him for about a mile. The boy lost consciousness, and the leader decided to leave him. By this time another member of the group, aged 18, had expressed a wish to stop; he was made comfortable on the path some 5 miles (8 km.) from base. The leader came on past him but later himself collapsed on the path. The remaining three boys met a local policeman who accompanied them to camp. A rescue party set out at 23.00 hours. The leader was found at 01.00 hours and recovered; he had been unconscious but had revived. The boy on the path was given mouth-to-mouth respiration but did not come round. The (Pugh, 1964 Table) . (1) Weather conditions. Setting out in extreme weather conditions (Incidents 2, 7, and 22) or being overtaken by bad weather (Incidents 3, 4, 6, 13, 17, 23) 
Signs and Symptoms
With minor variations the sequence of events was as follows: abnormal behaviour, slowing, stumbling, weakness, repeated falling, collapse, stupor, unconsciousness, death. Associated features sometimes present were: cramp, loss of sensation in the legs, paralysis, and convulsions. Visual disturbance was present in two mild cases not included in the series; in both instances the circumstances suggest glare conjunctivitis.
Shivering was not a prominent feature of the more serious cases. That is to say, it was not specifically mentioned in the histories. On the other hand, less severely affected persons described violent shivering (Incidents 3 and 9). In experimental hypothermia shivering ceases at rectal temperatures below 34 to 350 C. and is replaced by generalized muscular rigidity (Dill and Forbes, 1941 ; Alexander, 1949 Pugh, 1964) In the Cairngorm and Grampian mountains large areas of country are situated at heights over 3,000 feet (914 m.). In these regions mean temperatures are at least 80 C. lower than in London (50 C. reduction due to altitude and 30 C. due to latitude). In the colder months temperatures are often low enough (viz., -5°C.) for the wetting of clothing and footwear not to be a problem. Nevertheless, three out of four incidents from Scotland occurred in wet-cold rather than dry-cold conditions, suggesting that wet-cold is the more dangerous condition even in these regions.
Clothing
The clothing worn by hikers and climbers conforms to a general pattern, examples of which are given in the case histories. Even with extra sweaters it is doubtful if more than 2 Clo units of thermal insulation can be obtained with these outfits, since military cold climate assemblies in the last world war, which weighed over 20 lb. (9.1 kg.), had insulation values of only 3 to 4 Clo units (Breckenbridge and Woodcock, 1955) . In a companion paper experimental results are reported on the clothing worn by one of the youths who died on the Four Inns Walk in 1964 (Pugh, 1964, and Incident 23) . The insulation value of this outfit was 1.5 Clo units. When saturated with moisture and in the presence of wind, the insulation value fell to 0.15 Clo units, a much lower value than had been predicted (Pugh, 1964) .
Jeans and similar trousers are commonly worn by hikers, but climbers more often wear cord breeches and stockings, which give better protection, especially against wind. The anoraks commonly available to the public are showerproof but will not resist heavy rain or wet snow indefinitely.
The primary deficiencies of currently accepted clothing are, therefore, (i) lack of protection against wetting, and (ii) insufficient insulation and resistance to wind penetration over the legs. There is no doubt that correction of these deficiencies BRmSH MEDICAL JOURNAL would do much to reduce the incidence of hypothermia in this age group.
Subcutaneous Fat
The association between subcutaneous fat and resistance to body cooling in water has been convincingly demonstrated (Pugh and Edholm, 1955 ; Keatinge, 1960; Daniels and Baker, 1961 ; Rennie et al., 1962) . On the other hand, evidence from studies on cold-adapted social groups or individuals (Hammel, 1964; Pugh, 1964) do not support the view that subcutaneous fat plays an important part in cold resistance in air at low temperature. However, when a person's clothing is wet through, especially in the presence of wind, he is in much the same situation as a person in water at a somewhat higher temperature, and subcutaneous fat may then be decisive. This aspect is discussed in a companion paper (Pugh, to Adolph and Molnar (1946) suggest that local muscle cooling may have been a factor in exhaustion in their experiments, since muscle cooling may cause extreme muscular weakness in thin subjects swimming in water at these temperatures (Pugh and Edholm, 1955 ). An investigation of this aspect is being undertaken.
Mental Effects
Mental symptoms similar to those described in the case histories (see also Adolph and Molnar, 1946) 
Shelter
Physiological reasons for taking shelter rather than pushing on to exhaustion are examined in a companion paper (Pugh, 1965 , to be published). However, parties that cannot keep dry will be in serious danger at temperatures near freezing point unless they can either get off the mountain in time or set up a camp.
Camping
When a person shows early symptoms of exposure, the surest way of preventing disaster is to camp. The objections to carrying camping equipment are the extra weight and the expense involved. There is an urgent need for the development of light-weight and inexpensive emergency equipment for such parties.
Physique
Variation in capacity for physical exertion as well as other factors, such as limb length and subcutaneous fat, probably accounts for the fact that one member of a party usually fails before the others. The possibility of infection or illness should not be disregarded. In some youth movements boys do not select their own companions but are randomly grouped, and it should be borne in mind that the spread of physical working capacity may be too wide to be safe. Grouping by exercise history is perhaps the simplest safeguard.
Treatment
The evidence is that unconscious or nearly unconscious patients revive spontaneously whatever treatment is administered once further cooling has been prevented. For field emergencies spontaneous rewarming seems to be the safest, if not the only, practicable treatment. The Four Inns Walk incident showed clearly the danger of long evacuation by stretcher, and consideration should be given to rescue parties setting up camp and reviving casualties on the spot rather than attempting to transport them long distances. The danger of carrying patients in a head-up position is emphasized.
After rescue, the hot bath treatment will reduce the duration of hypothermia and is certainly the treatment of choice for the conscious patient. The postural manipulation involved may, however, be dangerous in the unconscious patient. Cooper (personal communication) has shown that the rapid rewarming of hypothermic patients without a fall in blood-pressure by immersing both hands in hot water is a possibility. In the unconscious patient this might be a safer method than the hot bath treatment.
Summary
Twenty-three exposure incidents in various parts of Britain are described. There were 25 deaths, 5 cases of unconsciousness with recovery, and 58 milder cases. Most cases occurred at temperatures near freezing point and in the presence of gales, wind, or snow, wet-cold conditions being more dangerous than dry-cold conditions.
Wet clothing and walking to the point of collapse were the two principal factors in fatal cases. Symptoms began usually 5 to. 6 hours after setting out. The interval between onset of symptoms and collapse and between collapse and death was variable, but might be as little as 1 to 2 hours respectively.
Convulsions occurred in two unconscious patients being carried in the head-up position.
Casualties could be prevented and lives saved by wider use of: (i) emergency dry clothing and waterproof overgarments, (ii) light-weight emergency camping equipment.
It is suggested that the safest treatment of such casualties, whether by other members of the same party or by rescuers) is to camp and allow the patients to rewarm spontaneously before moving them, unless the distance is short.
